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FROM THE MOUTH OF A FISH:  AN APPELLATE JUDGE 
REFLECTS ON ORAL ARGUMENT 
MICHAEL A. WOLFF* 
Sixty years ago, toward the end of a career that made him the top appellate 
lawyer of his day, John W. Davis (who also was the 1924 Democratic 
candidate for President) commented that any lecture on the subject of appellate 
argument should come from a judge rather than from a lawyer: 
Supposing fishes have the gift of speech.  Who would listen to a fisherman’s 
weary discourse on fly casting, the shape and color of the fly, the size of the 
tackle, the length of the line, the merit of different rod makers, and all the other 
tiresome stuff that fishermen talk about, if the fish himself could be induced to 
give his views in the most effective methods of approach.  For after all it is the 
fish that the angler is after . . . . 
It is true, is it not, that in the argument of an appeal the advocate is angling, 
consciously and deliberately angling, for the judicial mind.1 
Since I have been an appellate judge for only two and a half years, I draw 
upon cases and experiences from the previous twenty-eight years as a lawyer 
and law professor.  Most of the cases that I have heard as a judge of the 
Supreme Court of Missouri are fairly recent, obviously, and some may not 
even be final.  Hence, I will go back and look at cases that I argued as a lawyer 
through the lens of hindsight and from the perspective of a judge.  When I 
taught trial advocacy, I would occasionally remind students that a trial lawyer 
learns a great deal from the cases that he or she loses, and very little from those 
the lawyer wins.  If I won a case, I might mention it here.  If I do not mention 
the outcome of a particular case, you may assume that I learned a great deal. 
OUR SHRINKING ATTENTION SPAN 
We are at a point in our history when oral argument in appellate courts has 
greatly shrunk.  Just for context, I can tell you that when the great early 
twentieth century trial lawyer Clarence Darrow defended union activist Big 
Bill Haywood, in 1907, Darrow’s final argument to the jury lasted for eleven 
 
* Judge, Supreme Court of Missouri; former Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of 
Law.  The text is a lecture Judge Wolff delivered as the 2001 Adler Rosecan Jurist in Residence. 
 1. I am indebted to Seth Waxman, recent Solicitor General of the United States for that 
vignette.  Seth P. Waxman, In the Shadow of Daniel Webster, 47 FED. LAW 48, 48-49 (2000). 
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hours and fifteen minutes and was preceded and followed by prosecution 
arguments that lasted nearly three days.2  When I was last involved in the trial 
of lawsuits, in 1991, the attention span of jurors had shrunk substantially.  I 
had one hour for summation.  You may remember the popular television show 
of the time, L.A. Law.  The lawyers on that show could deliver a pretty 
dramatic final argument in about ninety seconds.  And those of us who wanted 
to talk for an hour or more in real courtrooms had to watch L.A. Law to know 
what jurors expected. 
Similarly, the attention span of appellate judges has shrunk considerably.  
One of the great appellate lawyers of the nineteenth century was Daniel 
Webster, and one of his most famous appeals was Trustees of Dartmouth 
College v. Woodward.3  There are quotations from Webster’s argument that are 
legendary.  But we should note that the argument in the Dartmouth College 
case spanned three days.4  By contrast, most of the cases currently argued in 
the Missouri Supreme Court are allowed fifteen minutes per side. 
So what to do with all that time?  One word: focus. 
The great majority of cases turn on a single issue.  At most, perhaps two or 
three core questions.  Almost invariably, the appellant or petitioner will raise a 
number of additional issues for the court to review and decide, but few of these 
“fringe” issues ever produce a reversal.5 
DOES ORAL ARGUMENT MATTER? 
How important is oral argument?  As a lawyer barely over a year out of 
law school, I was co-counsel on a case that was a civil rights action against a 
local electric utility, a private company, that we alleged was acting under color 
of state law.6  We had lost in the trial court, and after our brief was filed in the 
Eighth Circuit, we received a notice that the court had cancelled oral argument.  
I called an acquaintance who had finished a clerkship with an Eighth Circuit 
judge and asked what that meant.  The court of appeals rarely reverses trial 
judges, he said, especially the one in our case.  And the court certainly would 
 
 2. J. ANTHONY LUCAS, BIG TROUBLE: A MURDER IN A SMALL WESTERN TOWN SETS OFF 
A STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF AMERICA 707-21 (Simon & Schuster 1997). 
 3. 17 U.S. 518 (1819). 
 4. Waxman, supra note 1, at 50. 
 5. Judge Myron H. Bright of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, a former 
visiting faculty member at Saint Louis University, once observed that in the 5,000 appeals he had 
heard in his thirty-five years on the federal bench, “[a]t most, perhaps two or three core questions 
are crucial.  Yet almost invariably, the petitioner will raise a number of additional issues for the 
court to review and decide.  Few of these fringe issues ever produce a reversal, and most of the 
time they should be considered secondary to the heartwood of the case.”  Myron H. Bright, Focus 
on the Crucial Issue, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 31, 32 (Winter 1999). 
 6. Ihrke v. Northern State Power Co., 459 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1972), vacated as moot, 409 
U.S. 815 (1972). 
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not reverse the trial judge without exploring the issues at oral argument.  In 
short, he said, it’s over. 
Actually, as it turns out, we were lucky.  The court of appeals reversed the 
district court and reinstated our claim.  (The state action theory did not have a 
long life; the Supreme Court of the United States decided Metropolitan Edison 
two years later and said there was no state action by private utility 
companies.)7  We were also lucky in the sense that, had we gone for oral 
argument, we might have talked ourselves out of an appellate victory. 
In the 1980’s, Judge Myron H. Bright and two of his Eighth Circuit 
colleagues kept track over a period of time of the number of cases in which 
oral argument had changed the judge’s mind.  In all of the cases, the judges 
had read the briefs prior to oral argument, had formed a tentative conclusion, 
and then noted at the end of oral argument whether their vote on the case was 
consistent with the opinion they held prior to oral argument.  In Judge Bright’s 
case he changed his mind thirty-one percent of the time, and the other two 
colleagues were at seventeen percent and thirteen percent.8  When he first 
published these data in the mid-1980’s, I was shocked.  I could not imagine 
that a judge could be, well, frankly, so unprincipled as to change his mind that 
often.  But in the two and a half years I have been a judge, I’ve come to have 
considerable empathy with such flip-floppery. 
QUESTIONS FROM THE “HOT” BENCH 
So what’s the use of oral argument?  It depends on the bench.  There are 
some courts, and the court upon which I serve is not one of them, that are 
considered “cold” benches.  That is, the judges sit there and ask few, if any, 
questions and the attorneys follow their prepared script.  Ours, by contrast, is a 
“hot” bench, and the advocates in many cases have time for little else but 
answering our questions. 
One question that advocates frequently ask is whether the judges read the 
briefs.  Where the bench, or certain judges on the bench, are “hot,” in that they 
ask a lot of questions, you can assume that they have read the briefs.  If the 
court usually is one that does not ask questions, you may have to assume 
otherwise and at least give the judges a brief description of the factual context 
of the case and the issues raised before getting to the heart of your argument. 
For example, in another of my earlier cases in the South Dakota Supreme 
Court, there were five judges—four “colds” and one “hot.”  I was defending a 
woman accused of neglecting her child.  She was indeed a poor mother but 
mostly because she was simply poor.  The facts of the case were not uplifting 
so, as a young lawyer, I decided to make a constitutional argument.  My 
 
 7. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison, 419 U.S. 345 (1974). 
 8. Myron H. Bright, The Power of the Spoken Word: In Defense of Oral Argument, 72 
IOWA L. REV. 35, 40 nn.32, 33 (1986). 
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contention was that the statute allowing the woman to lose her child as a result 
of “neglect” had no standards and thus allowed arbitrary enforcement and 
deprived her of her constitutional rights.  Well, my theory was better than that, 
but I hope you get the picture.  At oral argument, four of the judges did a rather 
nice impression of Mt. Rushmore, but the fifth judge badgered me with the 
most hostile questions I had ever experienced in any court.  When I finished 
the argument I knew that this judge was the one who was really prepared on 
the case, had come to crucify me, and did.  And I had no doubt that he would 
write the opinion in the case and that I would lose.  I was correct.  I lost.  And 
my tormenter wrote an opinion—a dissent that accepted my theory.9 
The point of this story is that a judge may ask what seems to be a hostile 
question or many hostile questions, but the judge may be probing what is 
troubling him or her.  The judge may want to accept the theory you are 
espousing and takes oral argument as the opportunity to be the Devil’s 
advocate and to try to poke holes in your theory. 
THE ADVOCATE AS A PARTICIPANT IN THE COURT’S CONFERENCE 
I have given considerable thought to the questioning that comes from the 
bench.  Let me make an overall comment from my brief experience peering 
down at the nervous advocates who appear in our court.  If you listen to the 
lawyers’ arguments, interrupted by questions from the bench, you may at first 
blush get an impression of probing and badgering questions all directed at the 
hapless advocates. 
But let me offer a more positive and accurate view: what you’re really 
hearing is a conference on the case, many times not very dissimilar from the 
conference that the judges have about the case after oral argument when a vote 
is taken to tentatively decide the case. 
What the advocate is entitled to do in oral argument is to participate in a 
conversation with the judges who will be deciding the case and to act as a 
resource for the judges in clarifying questions that the judges may have after 
the briefs have been read. 
This is a very collegial view of the lawyer’s role. 
This collegial view acknowledges that the lawyers arguing the case are the 
lawyers in the room who know most about the case.  They are the ones who 
know, or should know, the factual record. 
I’m putting the oral argument in a very positive light and your role as 
lawyers in a central position—a teaching function if you will.  This view of 
oral argument puts the judges’ questions at the center of this process.  You may 
come to the courtroom with a beautifully organized outline, with all your 
arguments neatly arranged.  And then you find, to your apparent frustration, 
 
 9. In re D.K., 245 N.W.2d 644, 651 (S.D. 1976) (Winans, J., dissenting). 
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that you have hardly gotten to any of them in your fifteen minutes and your 
organizational precision has been shattered by all these “impertinent” 
questions.  That’s the wrong attitude, and you should never appear frustrated or 
impatient with questions. 
Early in my career, I argued in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals a legal 
aid case from South Dakota in which I had brought suit to force a county’s 
family planning program to allow minors access to birth control without 
parental consent.  I had a constitutional theory that, simply stated, if a minor 
could consent to an abortion under the progeny of Roe v. Wade,10 then 
certainly the minor should be able to give consent for the means to avoid a 
pregnancy in the first place.  The trial judge was not sympathetic.  He decided 
that the minor plaintiff, who was identified only by her initials, would have to 
have a guardian ad litem or next friend appointed by the court to represent her 
interest since she was a minor.  And, before making such appointment, he 
intended to have a hearing and ordered us to notify her parents of the pendency 
of the hearing.  Of course, parental notification, or lack thereof, was the point 
of the whole lawsuit.  I decided to refuse the order, stand on our position that 
she either did not need a guardian ad litem or next friend for declaratory relief 
or at least could have one other than a parent, and refused to notify the parents. 
The case was dismissed, and we took an appeal to the Eighth Circuit.  I had 
three pages of carefully prepared and organized notes.  I was ready to give a 
wonderful formal presentation.  And after I had prepared these formal 
arguments, I had, sort of as an afterthought, sat by myself in a dark room, since 
I had no one with me in St. Louis to help prepare me for the argument, and I 
just sat there and thought about all of the ridiculous, weird, and tough 
questions that judges might ask.  Those hours of introspection were actually 
the best preparation I had. 
The next day, I started my argument as follows: “May it please the court.  
This is a case about whether a minor can obtain birth control services without 
parental consent . . . .” 
At that point I was interrupted, sharply, by one of the judges who asked, 
“Counselor, isn’t this case really about Rule 17 and whether she is to have a 
guardian ad litem to protect her interests?” 
“Of course,” I replied. 
The twenty minutes allocated for oral argument stretched to over forty-five 
minutes as the judges peppered me with questions and bantered back and forth 
among each other over the points of law and the ramifications of the plaintiff’s 
position.  Could a ten-year old bring such a lawsuit?  I never once had the 
opportunity to look at those notes that I had so carefully prepared. 
By the way, my client’s position prevailed.  Judge William Webster (who 
later was director of the FBI and the CIA) wrote the majority opinion, and 
 
 10. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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there was a vigorous dissent condemning the desire for state supported extra-
marital foolery, et cetera.11 
THE IMPORTANCE OF “EARNEST CONVERSATION” 
When the whole point of oral argument becomes an exercise in answering 
the judge’s questions, the role of rhetoric, of dramatic flourish that we all 
dream of as advocates, evaporates.  Time has crunched us and taken away the 
opportunity for high suasion.  Let us consider again, for a moment by contrast, 
Daniel Webster’s argument in the Dartmouth College case.  Justice Joseph 
Story’s account of the argument noted that when Webster stopped speaking, it 
was some more minutes before anyone seemed inclined to break the silence 
and that the audience was greatly moved.  When the transcript of his argument 
in the Dartmouth College case was published, Webster eliminated much of the 
rhetoric which he called “peroration” because it embarrassed him.  However, 
one of those who attended the argument asserted that it was “pure reason” 
rather than eloquence that marked Webster’s argument, of “a tone of earnest 
conversation which ran throughout the great body of the speech.”12  Here are 
Webster’s famous concluding remarks: 
Sir, you may destroy this little institution; it is weak, it is in your hands.  I 
know it is one of the lesser lights in the literary horizon of our country.  You 
may put it out.  But if you do, you must carry through your work.  You must 
extinguish, one after another, all these great lights of science which for more 
than a century have thrown the radiance over our land.  It is, sir, as I have said, 
a small college.  And yet there are those who love it.13 
That may strike you as an appeal simply to emotion, and one that you will 
probably never be able to have the luxury of delivering yourself in any case.  
But notice the reasoning that is embedded in Webster’s words.  It is at the heart 
of many questions posed by appellate courts, particularly Supreme Courts: 
What is the effect of our decision?  Beyond the parties, how does this affect the 
law, other institutions in society and the stability of our institutions? 
To return to the subject of judges’ questions, there are many that take the 
form of “what if?”  What if we decide your way, what effect will it have?  
Some judges like to ask hypothetical questions, posing a set of facts different 
from those of your case.  The worst thing you can do is to tell the judge, “but 
that’s not this case.”  The judge already knows that that’s not this case.  He or 
she is probing to see what the implications are of the decision that you are 
urging upon the court, so have patience. 
 
 11. M.S. v. Wermers, 557 F.2d 170 (8th Cir. 1977) (Henley, J., dissenting).  Judge Henley’s 
dissent is perhaps more elegant than I give it credit for. 
 12. Waxman, supra note 1, at 49-50. 
 13. Id. at 50. 
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Questioning by judges does not normally include discussion of previous 
cases by name and detail.  But judges are mindful of precedent, and you should 
be ready for such questions, especially if your position involves uncharted 
territory.  One of my colleagues is fond of asking a question something like 
this: “What’s your closest case (meaning, closest Missouri case) supporting 
this position?”  I’ve never taken that to be a “trick” question, but simply one 
that ascertains how well grounded in precedent the advocate’s position is.  
Another of my colleagues will occasionally ask as follows: “How would you 
write this opinion, if we were to rule in your favor on this point?” or some such 
variation of that.  That question is about as close as you can get to telling you 
that you are in the room having a conference on the case. 
CANDOR COUNTS 
Answering judges’ questions requires absolute candor.  If you do not know 
the answer to a question, say so.  More importantly, if there is a precedent that 
is dead-on against you, deal with it.  Don’t ignore it.  Don’t hide it.  Judges on 
the whole have rather poor memories for such things as cases they have 
already decided.  But they have excellent memories for one thing—lawyers 
who try to fool them. 
I have talked about two kinds of questions, primarily: (1) those that go to 
the heart of a case, where something is troubling an individual judge or judges, 
and (2) those that seek to explore the ramification of a particular decision, what 
does it mean, how does it affect the related areas of the law. 
There are two more kinds of questions that I can touch on briefly: As I 
mentioned, you should imagine that you and the judges are having a 
conference about this case.  In this group, of which you are a part, a question 
might be directed to you that is really addressing a concern that one judge 
knows that one or more of the judge’s colleagues have.  So in a sense, with this 
kind of question, you may be getting the impression that the judges are talking 
to each other, and you are simply the conduit.  You should be an active 
conduit.  If the judge seems to be making a point, and the point is favorable to 
you, do your best to reinforce the point.  If the point is unfavorable, this is your 
opportunity to address the judge’s concerns and to turn the point in your favor.  
Even if the question seems unfavorable, you should welcome the opportunity 
to address the point because if the judge does not ask the question, you have no 
such opportunity. 
Finally, there is the kind of question that is intended to draw a concession.  
These can be traps for the unwary.  But you will be so well prepared that you 
will not be unwary.  An example: Some years ago, when I was in South 
Dakota, a lawyer of my acquaintance argued a case in the Eighth Circuit on 
behalf of a young schoolteacher in a small town in western South Dakota who 
had been fired for living in sin, as they say, with her boyfriend.  The young 
lawyer took her case to the federal district court on constitutional “right of 
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privacy” theory, and he lost.  But maybe this constitutional issue was not one 
that needed to be decided.  The schoolteacher had in fact moved away, and so 
one of the judges asked an obvious question: “If we rule in her favor, will she 
move back to this small town and resume her teaching career?” 
“No,” the lawyer replied.  The schoolteacher had returned to New York 
and would not seek reinstatement.  The court of appeals issued its decision 
declining to decide the “privacy” issue because the teacher no longer was in a 
position to get any relief.14 
But making a concession in answer to a question is not always a bad thing.  
There are some recent criminal cases that come to mind involving the State of 
Missouri where the State conceded that the ruling of the trial court was wrong 
on a point of evidence, but then argued that the defendant was not 
prejudiced—that is, that the trial court’s error did not make any difference in 
the ultimate outcome of the trial.  That kind of concession can be extremely 
useful because the court views the advocate as an honest broker of information. 
Let me use the time remaining to highlight a few other matters that I think 
might be helpful. 
PREPARATION AND “APPELLATE PLEADING” 
I have already stressed preparation.  Arguing an appeal is not a process 
divorced from the proceedings of the trial court.  As you probably already 
know, if a point is to be raised on appeal it must have been presented first to 
the trial court.  There are some rare exceptions.  But in general, the trial court 
judge must have an opportunity to rule on the matter in the first instance or to 
correct his or her mistake before the issue is argued in the court of appeals or 
supreme court.  So it is important, at the outset, to be familiar with the record 
in the court below.  If the matter involved a trial, it is important that the issues 
that are to be presented on appeal have been raised in the motion for a new 
trial. 
The briefs—sometimes I wonder how briefs got that name, especially after 
I read one that is substantially lengthy and raises many points.  My colleagues 
who have been trial judges know, of course, that trial judges rarely make 
mistakes.  On the other hand, my former Saint Louis University colleague, 
Charles Blackmar, who served on the Missouri Supreme Court until his 
retirement some ten years ago, was fond of saying that the role of the supreme 
court was to protect the public from bureaucrats and trial judges.  In the trials 
in which I have been involved, I think even the best trial judges make errors at 
the rate of one or two a day in the course of a week-long trial—maybe more.  
But which of those errors really matters?  If you look at the West key number 
 
 14. Sullivan v. Meade Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 F.2d 799, 808 (8th Cir. 1976). 
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system on evidence, you may note a very voluminous entry is “harmless 
error.” 
When I was talking specifically about oral argument, I said your duty was 
to focus.  The same duty exists when preparing the brief.  What crucial error, I 
mean one, or two, or maybe three, will result in a reversal? 
Next comes the challenge of how to frame the issues.  In the federal 
system, the parties are simply required to state the issue.  As those of you who 
have prepared briefs in Missouri appellate courts know, we have a 
particularized version called “points relied on.”15  The issue, as you know it 
from the federal system, is embedded in our Missouri system in the point relied 
on, which requires the advocate to identify the ruling that is challenged, how it 
was wrong, and be rather specific about the matter. 
In either system, one that requires a statement of the issues, or ours which 
requires “points relied on,” you might conceptualize this writing as a form of 
appellate pleading.  In your Civil Procedure and pre-trial courses you learn that 
pleadings have traditionally been used to delineate an outline of contentions or 
factual propositions that are to be tried.  Even though these appellate 
“pleadings” deal only with points of law—a fairly strict, pleading-oriented 
view of the “issues” or “points”—you will find judges asking whether or not 
you have preserved an issue and whether you have framed that issue of law so 
that an appellate court can address and decide it. 
You should also pay specific attention to the “standard of review.”  In fact, 
our rules now require an advocate in his or her brief to set forth the appropriate 
standard of review.16  In other words, is the point presented an issue solely of 
law, which can be reviewed by the appellate court de novo?  Or is the 
purported error a matter that is generally left to the trial court’s discretion?  If 
 
 15. See MO. SUP. CT. R. 84.04(d).  Rule 84.04(d), in part, is as follows: 
  RULE 84.04 BRIEFS—CONTENTS 
  (d) Points Relied On. 
  (1) Where the appellate court reviews the decision of a trial court, each point shall: 
  (A) identify the trial court ruling or action that the appellant challenges; 
  (B) state concisely the legal reasons for the appellant’s claim of reversible error; and 
  (C) explain in summary fashion why, in the context of the case, those legal reasons 
support the claim of reversible error. 
  The point shall be in substantially the following form: “The trial court erred in 
[identify the challenged ruling or action], because [state the legal reasons for the claim of 
reversible error], in that [explain why the legal reasons, in the context of the case, support 
the claim of reversible error].” 
. . . 
  (4) Abstract statements of law, standing alone, do not comply with this rule.  Any 
reference to the record shall be limited to the ultimate facts necessary to inform the 
appellate court and the other parties of the issues.  Detailed evidentiary facts shall not be 
included. 
 16. MO. SUP. CT. R. 84.04(e). 
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the latter, the burden on the appellant is to show that the trial judge abused his 
or her discretion. 
Many cases involve the interpretation of a statute or a contractual provision 
or even a constitutional article.  In your brief, make sure you prominently 
present to us the exact wording of the statute, contract or constitutional 
provision.  In fact, I would recommend adding an appendix to your brief with 
the relevant statute, contract or constitutional provision set forth in full. 
THE USE OF EXHIBITS 
When you’re in oral argument discussing a statutory provision, you might 
consider blowing up the language on a projector or a piece of foam board that 
you can put on an easel.  But I must caution you: some of us have poor 
eyesight.  I have seen, or more accurately not seen, quite a few exhibits with 
statutory language or contract provisions blown up so that the advocate and the 
judges could examine the language together.  The only problem was that at a 
bench long enough for seven judges, the print is rarely big enough for all of us 
to see.  So you can either give us an individual copy or refer to your appendix, 
to follow along, or you can let us sit there and be annoyed. 
Seeing it and hearing at the same time really enhances our understanding.  
I argued a case in the Missouri Court of Appeals some years ago involving a 
jury instruction where I was complaining that the jury had been misinstructed 
by the use of the word “a” rather than the word “the.”  The case involved the 
sinking of a riverboat restaurant in downtown St. Louis, and the suit was 
against the insurance company for failure to pay a claim based upon loss of the 
vessel by “the perils of the inland waters.”  That was the phrase used in the 
insurance contract and in the main jury instruction.  But the jury was 
conversely instructed—at the insurance company’s request—that its verdict 
must be for the insurance company unless it found that the loss of the vessel 
had been occasioned by a peril of the inland waters.  My argument was that the 
main instruction, and the contract itself, did not require us to show what 
particular peril caused the loss; but the converse instruction misled the jury 
into thinking that our side had to prove that a particular peril caused the loss.17 
Now that I’ve thoroughly confused you about what I was trying to say, you 
can imagine that it was helpful that I put the two jury instructions up on an 
overhead projector and pointed to the words as I discussed them.  That may 
sound a bit like a schoolteacher, but an appellate advocate will sometimes play 
that role.  And I don’t think I could have adequately explained the difference or 
won the appeal on that point without showing the actual words and pointing to 
them.  That is the one time I think an exhibit can be helpful. 
 
 17. Wilmering v. Lexington Ins. Co., 678 S.W.2d 865 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). 
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WE’RE NOT JURORS 
You can overdo exhibits.  You’ve got to be careful not to treat the judges 
as though they were another jury.  If you have gory pictures of the victim—
either of a crime or of a personal injury—you might want to emote about them.  
Save yourself.  Don’t do it. 
Some emotional content in your argument and certainly a sincere belief in 
what you are saying will help you to be persuasive.  But don’t treat us like 
jurors.  Remember the style reported of Daniel Webster; use a “tone of earnest 
conversation.”18 
Along these same lines, I have pondered the wisdom of bringing one’s 
client to the oral arguments.  I personally do not care, but I know judges who 
do feel that it is not a good thing.  Some judges believe the client has a right to 
be there because the client is paying for it.  But the negative judicial outlook is 
that oral argument is a time for a reasoned exchange of views, not for rhetoric, 
as I have already emphasized. 
I think the danger of having your client there is that if you do get a little 
carried away, rhetorically speaking, the judges may get the unfavorable 
impression that you are showboating for your client, rather than addressing the 
judges’ needs for reasoned analysis and information.  By the way, the 
arguments of the Missouri Supreme Court are now available live and in 
archived form at www.missourinet.com.  So if you have a client who fervently 
wishes to hear your wondrous phrases, he or she can tune in on the computer, 
or even click on to it later, or over and over, and listen to how wonderful you 
were. 
I also mention the Internet availability because it is a valuable resource for 
lawyers preparing for oral argument in the Missouri Supreme Court.  Find a 
similar case, click on it and listen to the arguments.  You can tell by the kinds 
of questions and by the tone of the questioning what you are likely to be in for.  
That, it seems to me, should be an essential part of the preparation process. 
Well that’s it from the mouth of a fish.  I hope it will help you hook some.  
And unlike the anglers of yesteryear who could spend all day in the boat, you 
have fifteen minutes.  So focus. 
 
 18. Waxman, supra note 1, at 50. 
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